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Abstract An authenticated encryption (AE) scheme simul-
taneously achieves two security goals: confidentiality and
authenticity. AE can be divided into symmetric AE and
asymmetrical (public key) AE. In a symmetric AE scheme,
deniability is gained automatically.However, a public keyAE
scheme can not gain deniability automatically; on the con-
trary, it provides non-repudiation. In this paper, we address
a question on deniability of public key AE. Of course, we
can achieve this goal by “deniable authentication followed
by encryption” method. However, such method has the fol-
lowing two weaknesses: (1) the computational cost and
communication overhead are the sum of two cryptographic
primitives; (2) it is complex todesign cryptographic protocols
with deniable authentication and confidentiality using two
cryptographic primitives. To overcome the two weaknesses,
we propose a new concept called deniable authenticated
encryption (DAE) that can achieve both the functions of
deniable authentication and public key encryption simul-
taneously, at a cost significantly lower than that required
by the “deniable authentication followed by encryption”
method. This single cryptographic primitive can simplify
the design of cryptographic protocols with deniable authen-
tication and confidentiality. In particular, we construct an
identity-based deniable authenticated encryption (IBDAE)
scheme. Our construction uses tag-key encapsulation mech-
anism (KEM) and data encapsulation mechanism (DEM)
hybrid techniques, which is more practical for true applica-
tions. We show how to construct an IBDAE scheme using an
identity-based deniable authenticated tag-KEM (IBDATK)
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and a DEM. We also propose an IBDATK scheme and prove
its security in the random oracle model. For typical secu-
rity level, our scheme is at least 50.7 and 22.7% faster than
two straightforward “deniable authentication followed by
encryption” schemes, respectively. The communication over-
head is respectively reduced at least 21.3 and 31.1%. An
application of IBDAE to an e-mail system is described.
Keywords Security · Authenticated encryption · Identity-
based cryptography · Deniability · E-mail system
1 Introduction
An authenticated encryption (AE) scheme simultaneously
achieves two security goals: confidentiality and authenticity.
AE can be divided into symmetric AE [1] and asymmetrical
(public key) AE [2,3]. A symmetric AE use a keyed hash (i.e,
a MAC) with some appropriate key K1 along with a secure
encryption scheme with an independent key K2 to achieve
AE. In this model, we need agree K1 and K2 between the
sender and the receiver in advance. The authenticity of sym-
metric AE is deniable authentication since both the sender
and the receiver can generate the same ciphertext. That is,
the receiver can generate a ciphertext that is indistinguish-
able from that generated by the sender. A public key AE
integrates public key encryption and digital signature in a
single procedure to reduce the computation and communi-
cation cost. A public key AE does not automatically achieve
deniable authentication since only the sender can generate a
valid ciphertext. That is, a public key AE scheme provides
non-repudiation. Therefore, there is an important difference
about authenticity between symmetric AE and public key
AE. The symmetric AE is deniable and the public key AE is
not deniable.
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1.1 Motivation and contribution
In this paper, we address a question on deniability of public
key AE. Of course, we can achieve this goal by “deniable
authentication followed by encryption” method. However,
such method has the following two weaknesses: (1) the com-
putational cost and communication overhead are the sum of
two cryptographic primitives; (2) it is complex to design
cryptographic protocols with deniable authentication and
confidentiality using two cryptographic primitives. In this
paper, we propose a new concept called deniable authenti-
cated encryption (DAE) that can achieve both the functions
of deniable authentication and public key encryption simul-
taneously, at a cost significantly lower than that required
by the “deniable authentication followed by encryption”
method. This single cryptographic primitive can simplify
the design of cryptographic protocols with deniable authen-
tication and confidentiality. In particular, we construct an
identity-based deniable authenticated encryption (IBDAE)
scheme. Our construction uses tag-key encapsulation mech-
anism (KEM) and data encapsulation mechanism (DEM)
hybrid techniques, which is more practical for true applica-
tions. We show how to construct an IBDAE scheme using an
identity-based deniable authenticated tag-KEM (IBDATK)
and a DEM. We also propose an IBDATK scheme and prove
its security in the random oracle model. An application of
IBDAE to an e-mail system is described.
1.2 Related work
Here we introduce four related notions, identity-based cryp-
tography (IBC), hybrid encryption, and deniable authentica-
tion.
IBC is introduced by Shamir [4] in 1984. Compared with
the public key infrastructure (PKI), the main advantage of
the IBC is the elimination of public key certificates. In
the IBC, a user’s public key can be derived directly from
its identity information, such as telephone numbers, e-mail
addresses and IP addresses. The private key of the user is
generated by a trusted third party called private key gen-
erator (PKG). Authenticity of the public key is explicitly
verified without requiring an attached public key certificate.
The IBC is very suitable for developing a secure e-mail
system. When Alice hopes to send an e-mail to Bob at
bob@uestc.edu.cn, she encrypts her message using the
string “bob@uestc.edu.cn”. In this process, Alice does
not need to obtain Bob’s public key certificate. When Bob
receives the encrypted e-mail, he applies for a private key
from the PKG and then decrypts his e-mail. Note that unlike
the PKI-based e-mail systems, Alice can send an encrypted
e-mail to Bob even if Bob has not obtained his key pair
information. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [5] designed a
practical identity-based encryption (IBE) schemeusing bilin-
ear pairings and proved its security in the random oracle
model. Park and Lee [6] proposed another IBE scheme that
achieves a tight security reduction to the decisional bilin-
ear Diffie–Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
In 2002, Hess [7] constructed an identity-based signature
(IBS) whose security depends on the hardness of the Diffie–
Hellman problem in the random oracle model. In 2003, Cha
and Cheon [8] designed a new IBS using gap Diffie–Hellman
groups. In 2011, Hsu and Lin [9,10] extended AE into the
identity-based environment and constructed identity-based
authenticated encryption (IBAE). However, these two IBAE
schemes have non-repudiation. That is, they are not deniable.
Some identity-based signcryption (IBSC) [11–13] also were
proposed to achieve both confidentiality and authentication.
However, these IBSC schemes still have non-repudiation.
The practical way to perform secret communication for
large messages is to use hybrid encryption. The hybrid
encryption splits the encryption process into two parts: one
part uses public key techniques to encrypt a one-time sym-
metric key; the other part uses the symmetric key to encrypt
the actual message. In such a construction, the public key
part is called key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and the
symmetric key part is called data encapsulation mechanism
(DEM). In 2003, Cramer and Shoup [14] first gave a formal
analysis for the hybrid KEM–DEM construction. Then some
efficient KEM–DEM constructions have been proposed [15–
17]. The advantage of this paradigm is that it gives a clear
separation between the various parts of the cipher allowing
for modular design. In [15], Abe et al. introduced tag-KEM
that takes as input a tag in KEM. Note that the using of tag-
KEM brings simpler scheme descriptions and better generic
security reductions. Bentahar et al.’s [18] extended KEM
into identity-based environment and proposed several effi-
cient constructions of identity-basedKEM. In 2014, Abdalla
et al. [19] discussed the relation between the notions of ver-
ifiable random functions and identity-based KEM.
Deniable authentication is different to traditional authen-
tication and has the following two main characteristics: (1) it
enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given
message; (2) the intended receiver cannot prove the source of
a given message to any third party. Deniable authentication
can be used in many specialized applications. For example,
it can provide freedom from coercion in electronic voting
systems and secure negotiation over the Internet [20,21]. In
2005, Shi and Li [22] extended deniable authentication into
identity-based environment and designed an identity-based
deniable authentication (IBDA) protocol. Kar [23] designed
an IBDAprotocol based onDiffie–Hellmanproblemassump-
tion. However, Kar’s protocol is interactive. An interactive
protocol usually consumes more communication cost than a
non-interactive protocol. In 2014, Li et al. [24] proposed a
non-interactive IBDA protocol using bilinear pairings under
the bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption. In addition, their
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protocol supports batch verification that can speed up the
verification of authenticators.
1.3 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We define the
formal model of IBDAE in Sect. 2. The IBDATK is given in
Sect. 3. We show how to construct an IBDAE scheme using
an IBDATK and a DEM in Sect. 4. An example of IBDATK
is described in Sect. 5. We discuss the performance of our
scheme in Sect. 6. A secure e-mail protocol based on IBDAE
is designed in Sect. 7. Finally, the conclusions are given in
Sect. 8.
2 IBDAE
In this section, we give the formal definition and security
notions for IBDAE.
2.1 Syntax
Ageneric IBDAE scheme consists of the following four algo-
rithms.
– Setup is a probabilistic algorithm run by a PKG that
takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs amaster
secret key s and the system parameters param including
a master public key Ppub. Here we assume that param
are public so that we do not need to include them in other
algorithms.
– Extract is a key extraction algorithm run by the PKG
that takes as input an identity I D and the master secret
key s, and outputs the corresponding private key SI D .
The PKG transmits the private key to its owner in a secure
way.
– Encrypt is a probabilistic deniable authenticated
encryption algorithm run by a sender that takes as input
a messagem, a sender’s private key SI Ds and a receiver’s
identity I Dr , and outputs a ciphertext σ .
– Decrypt is a deterministic deniable authenticated
decryption algorithm run by a receiver that takes as input
a ciphertext σ , a sender’s identity I Ds and a receiver’s
private key SI Dr , and outputs a plaintextm or the symbol
⊥ if σ is an invalid ciphertext between the sender and the
receiver.
For consistency,we require that ifσ =Encrypt(m, SI Ds ,
I Dr ), then we have m = Decrypt(σ, I Ds, SI Dr ). Note
that here Encrypt and Decrypt are different from com-
mon Encrypt and Decrypt in public key encryption schemes.
Here Encrypt means deniable authenticated encryption
and Decrypt means deniable authenticated decryption.
In the following contents, encryption and decryption usual
mean deniable authenticated encryption and deniable authen-
ticated decryption, respectively.
2.2 Security notions
An IBDAE scheme should satisfy confidentiality and deni-
able authentication. Here we give two games to capture the
two security properties.
The standard adopted security notion for confidentiality
is the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack (IND-CCA2). We apply this notion to our IBDAE.
We consider the following game (Game-I) played between a
challenger C and an adversary A.
– Initial C runs Setup algorithmwith a security para-
meter k and sends the system parameters param to A.
– Phase 1 A performs a polynomially bounded number
of queries (these queries may be made adaptively, i.e.
each query may depend on the answer to the previous
queries).
– Key extraction queries A chooses an identity I D. C
runs Extract algorithm and sends the correspond-
ing private key SI D to A.
– Encryption queries A produces a plaintext m and
two identities I Di and I D j . C first runs Extract
algorithm to generate the sender’s private key SI Di .
Then C runsEncrypt(m, SI Di , I D j ) algorithm and
sends σ to A.
– Decryption queries A produces a ciphertext σ and
two identities I Di and I D j . C first runs Extract
algorithm to generate the receiver’s private key SI D j .
Then C runs Decrypt(σ, I Di , SI D j ) algorithm and
sends the result to A (this result can be the ⊥ symbol
if σ is an invalid ciphertext).
– ChallengeA decides when phase 1 ends.A generates
two equal length plaintextsm0 andm1 and two identities
I Ds and I Dr on which it wants to be challenged. It can
not have asked the private key corresponding to I Dr in
the phase 1. C takes a randombitβ ∈ {0, 1} and computes
σ ∗ = Encrypt(mβ, SI Ds , I Dr ) which is sent to A.
– Phase 2A can ask a polynomially bounded number of
queries adaptively again as in the phase 1. This time, it
can not ask a key extraction query on I Dr and can not
ask a decryption query on (σ ∗, I Ds, I Dr ) to obtain the
corresponding plaintext.
– GuessA produces a bit β ′ and wins the game if β ′ = β.
The advantage of A is defined as Adv(A) = |2Pr[β ′ = β]−
1|, where Pr[β ′ = β] denotes the probability that β ′ = β.
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Definition 1 An adversary A is said to be an (dae, t, qk,
qe, qd)-attacker of an IBDAE scheme if A has advan-
tage at least dae in the Game-I, runs in time at most t ,
and makes at most qk key extraction queries, qe encryp-
tion queries and qd decryption queries. An IBDAE scheme
is said to be (dae, t, qk, qe, qd)-IND-CCA2 secure if no
(dae, t, qk, qe, qd)-attacker exists.
Note that A is allowed to make a key extraction query on
identity I Ds in the Game-I. It ensures the forward security
of the scheme, i.e. confidentiality is preserved in case the
sender’s private key becomes compromised.
For the deniable authentication,we adopt deniable authen-
tication against adaptive chosenmessages attack (DA-CMA)
notion in [24]. We consider the following game (Game-II)
played between a challenger C and an adversary F .
– Initial C runs Setup algorithmwith a security para-
meter k and sends the system parameters param to F .
– Attack F performs a polynomially bounded number
of queries just like in the Game-I.
– Forgery F produces a triple (σ ∗, I Ds, I Dr ) and wins
the game if the following conditions hold:
1. Decrypt(σ ∗, I Ds, SI Dr ) = m∗.
2. F has not asked key extraction queries on I Ds and
I Dr .
3. F has not asked an encryption query on (m∗, I Ds,
I D′r ). Here I D′r may be different from I Dr .
The advantage of F is defined as the probability that it wins.
Definition 2 An adversary F is said to be an (dae, t, qk,
qe, qd)-forger of an IBDAE scheme if F has advantage
at least dae in the Game-II, runs in time at most t , and
makes at most qk key extraction queries, qe encryption
queries and qd decryption queries. An IBDAE scheme
is said to be (dae, t, qk, qe, qd)-DA-CMA secure if no
(dae, t, qk, qe, qd)-forger exists.
Note that F is not allowed to make a key extraction query
on identity I Dr in the Game-II. This condition is necessary
to obtain the deniability property. The sender can deny its
action since the receiver also can generate a valid ciphertext.
This is the main difference between deniable authentication
in DAE and undeniable authentication in digital signature.
3 IBDATK
In this section, we give the formal definition and security
notions for identity-based deniable authenticated tag-KEM
(IBDATK). IBDATK can be considered as an identity-based
tag-KEM with deniable authentication property. IBDATK
should provide two important security properties: confiden-
tiality and deniable authentication.
3.1 Syntax
A generic IBDATK scheme consists of the following five
algorithms.
– Setup is a probabilistic algorithm run by a PKG that
takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs the
system’s parameters param, including a master public
key Ppub and a master secret key s. We also assume that
param are public so that we do not need to include them
in other algorithms.
– Extract is a key extraction algorithm run by the PKG
that takes as input an identity I D and the master secret
key s, and outputs the corresponding private key SI D .
The PKG transmits the private key to its owner in a secure
way.
– Sym is a probabilistic symmetric key generation algo-
rithm run by a sender that takes as input a sender’s private
key SI Ds and a receiver’s identity I Dr , andoutputs a sym-
metric key K together with internal state information ω.
Here K ∈ KIBDATK is a key in the space of possible ses-
sion keys at a given security level. KIBDATK is the key
space.
– Encap is a probabilistic key encapsulation algorithm
which takes as input the state information ω and an arbi-
trary tag τ , and returns an encapsulation ψ ∈ EIBDATK.
Here EIBDATK is the encapsulation space.
– Decap is a deterministic decapsulation algorithm run by
a receiver that takes as input an encapsulation ψ , a tag τ ,
a sender’s identity I Ds and a receiver’s private key SI Dr ,
and outputs the corresponding key K or a special symbol
⊥ indicating invalid encapsulation.
We make the consistency constraint that if (K , ω) =
Sym(SI Ds , I Dr ) and ψ = Encap(ω, τ), then K =
Decap(ψ, τ, I Ds, SI Dr ).
3.2 Security notions
An IBDATK scheme should satisfy confidentiality and deni-
able authentication. We give the formal security definition
here. For the confidentiality, we consider the following game
(Game-III) played between a challenger C and an adversary
A.
– Initial C runs Setup algorithmwith a security para-
meter k and sends the system parameters param to A.
– Phase 1 A performs a polynomially bounded number
of queries (these queries may be made adaptively, i.e.
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each query may depend on the answer to the previous
queries).
– Key extraction queries A chooses an identity I D. C
runs Extract algorithm and sends the correspond-
ing private key SI D to A.
– Symmetric key generation queries A produces a
sender’s identity I Di and a receiver’s identity I D j .
C first runs Extract algorithm to generate the
sender’s private key SI Di and runs (K , ω) =
Sym(SI Di , I D j ). It then stores the value ω (hidden
from the view of the adversary, and overwriting any
previously stored values), and sends the symmetric
key K to A.
– Key encapsulation queries A produces an arbitrary
tag τ . C checks whether there exists a stored value ω.
If not, it returns⊥ and terminates. Otherwise it erases
the value fromstorage and returnsψ = Encap(ω, τ)
to A.
– Key decapsulation queries A chooses an encapsu-
lation ψ , a tag τ , a sender’s identity I Di and a
receiver’s identity I D j . C first runs Extract algo-
rithm to generate the receiver’s private key SI D j .
Then C runs Decap(ψ, τ, I Di , SI D j ) algorithm and
sends the result to A.
– ChallengeA decides when phase 1 ends.A generates
a sender’s identity I Ds and a receiver’s identity I Dr on
which itwishes to be challenged. The identity I Dr should
not appear in any key extraction queries in phase 1. C
first runs (K1, ω∗) = Sym(SI Ds , I Dr ). Then C chooses
K0 ∈ KIBDATK and a bit β ∈ {0, 1} randomly, and sends
Kβ to A. When A receives Kβ , it may ask the same
queries as previously. ThenA generates a tag τ ∗. Finally,
C computes ψ∗ = Encap(ω∗, τ ∗) and sends it to A as
a challenge encapsulation.
– Phase 2A can ask a polynomially bounded number of
queries adaptively again as in phase 1 with the restriction
that it can not ask a key extraction query on I Dr and can
not ask a decapsulation query on (ψ∗, τ ∗, I Ds, I Dr ) to
obtain the corresponding key.
– GuessA produces a bit β ′ and wins the game if β ′ = β.
The advantage of A is defined as Adv(A) = |2Pr[β ′ = β]−
1|, where Pr[β ′ = β] denotes the probability that β ′ = β.
Definition 3 AnadversaryA is said to be an (datk, t, qk, qs,
qe, qd)-attacker of an IBDATK scheme if A has advan-
tage at least datk in the Game-III, runs in time at most
t , and asks at most qk key extraction queries, qs symmet-
ric key generation queries, qe key encapsulation queries
and qd key decapsulation queries. An IBDATK scheme is
said to be (datk, t, qk, qs, qe, qd)-IND-CCA2 secure if no
(datk, t, qk, qs, qe, qd)-attacker exists.
For deniable authentication, we consider the following
game (Game-IV) played between a challenger C and an
adversary F .
– Initial C runs Setup algorithmwith a security para-
meter k and sends the system parameters param to F .
– Attack F performs a polynomially bounded number
of queries just like in the Game-III.
– Forgery F produces a quaternion (ψ∗, τ ∗, I Ds, I Dr )
and wins the game if the following conditions hold:
1. Decap(ψ∗, τ ∗, I Ds, SI Dr ) = K ∗.
2. F has not asked key extraction queries on I Ds and
I Dr .
3. F has not asked a key encapsulation query on τ ∗.
The advantage of F is defined as the probability that it wins.
Definition 4 AnadversaryF is said to be an (datk, t, qk, qs,
qe, qd)-forger of an IBDATK scheme if F has advantage
at least datk in the Game-IV, runs in time at most t ,
and asks at most qk key extraction queries, qs symmet-
ric key generation queries, qe key encapsulation queries
and qd key decapsulation queries. An IBDATK scheme is
said to be (datk, t, qk, qs, qe, qd)-DA-CMA secure if no
(datk, t, qk, qs, qe, qd)-forger exists.
4 A hybrid IBDAE scheme
We can combine an IBDATK scheme IBDATK with a DEM
scheme DEM (the definition of DEM can be found in Appen-
dix 1) to form a hybrid IBDAE scheme IBDAE. Our method
is described in Fig. 1. Note that the tag is the ciphertext out-
put by the DEM. Such construction yields simpler scheme
descriptions and better generic security reductions.
We give the security results for such construction in The-
orems 1 and 2.
Theorem 1 Let IBDAE be a hybrid IBDAE scheme con-
structed from an IBDATK scheme IBDATK and a DEM
scheme DEM. If the IBDATK is (datk, t, qk, qs, qe, qd)-IND-
CCA2 secure and the DEM is (dem, t¯)-IND-PA secure, then
the IBDAE is (dae, t ′, q ′k, q ′e, q ′d)-IND-CCA2 secure, where
datk ≥ (dae − dem)/2, t = t ′ + t¯ + O(q ′eTenc + q ′dTdec),
qk = q ′k , qs = qe = q ′e, qd = q ′d . Here Tenc and Tdec are
the maximum time for computing an encryption in DEM and
a decryption in DEM.
Proof See Appendix 2. unionsq
Theorem 2 Let IBDAE be a hybrid IBDAE scheme con-
structed from an IBDATK scheme IBDATK and a DEM
scheme DEM. If the IBDATK is (datk, t, qk, qs, qe, qd)-DA-
CMA secure, then the IBDAE is (dae, t ′, q ′k, q ′e, q ′d)-DA-
CMA secure, where datk ≥ dae, t = t ′ + O(q ′eTenc +
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Fig. 1 Construction of IBDAE
from IBDATK and DEM
IBDAE.Setup: On input a security parameter k:
1. (param, s) = IBDATK.Setup(k)
2. Output the system parameters param and the master secret key s
IBDAE.Extract: On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and the master secret key s:
1. SID = IBDATK.Extract(ID, s)
2. Output the private key SID for the identity ID
IBDAE.Encrypt: On input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, a sender’s private key SIDs
and a receiver’s identity IDr:
1. (K, ω) = IBDATK.Sym(SIDs , IDr)
2. c = DEM.Enc(K, m)
3. ψ = IBDATK.Encap(ω, c)
4. Output the ciphertext σ = (ψ, c)
IBDAE.Decrypt: On input a ciphertext σ, a sender’s identity IDs and a receiver
private key SIDr :
1. K = IBDATK.Decap(ψ, c, IDs, SIDr )
2. If K = ⊥, then output ⊥ and stop
3. m = DEM.Dec(K, c)
4. Output the message m
q ′dTdec), qk = q ′k , qs = qe = q ′e, qd = q ′d . Here Tenc and
Tdec are the maximum time for computing an encryption in
DEM and a decryption in DEM.
Proof See Appendix 3. unionsq
5 An efficient IBDATK scheme
In this section, we propose an efficient IBDATK scheme
using bilinear pairings. We first describe the basic defini-
tion and properties of the bilinear pairings. The we give the
IBDATK scheme and discuss its consistency, deniability and
security.
5.1 Bilinear pairings
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose
order is a prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of
the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map eˆ : G1 ×G1 →
G2 with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈ G1,
a, b ∈ Z∗q .
2. Non-degeneracy There are P and Q ∈ G1 such that
eˆ(P, Q) 
= 1, where 1 is the identity element of group
G2.
3. Computability There is an efficient algorithm to compute
eˆ(P, Q) for all P ,Q ∈ G1.
The modified Weil pairing and the Tate pairing [5,7,8]
are admissible maps of this kind. The security of our scheme
described here relies on the hardness of the following prob-
lems.
Given two groups G1 and G2 of the same prime order
q, a bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 and a generator P of
G1, the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) problem
in (G1,G2, eˆ) is to decide whether θ = eˆ(P, P)abc or not
given (P, aP, bP, cP) and an element θ ∈ G2. We define
the advantage of an adversary C against the DBDH like this
Adv(C) = |Pa,b,c,∈Z∗q ,θ∈G2 [C(P, aP, bP, cP, θ) = 1]
−Pa,b,c,∈Z∗q [C(P, aP, bP, cP, eˆ(P, P)abc)=1]|.
Definition 5 The (dbdh, t)-DBDH assumption holds if no
t-polynomial time adversary C has advantage at least dbdh
in solving the DBDH problem.
Given two groups G1 and G2 of the same prime order q,
a bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 and a generator P of G1,
the bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) problem in (G1,G2, eˆ)
is to compute h = eˆ(P, P)abc given (P, aP, bP, cP).
Definition 6 The (bdh, t)-BDH assumption holds if no t-
polynomial time adversary C has advantage at least bdh in
solving the BDH problem.
5.2 Our scheme
Our scheme consists of the following five algorithms.
– Setup Define G1, G2 and eˆ as in Sect. 5.1. Let H1, H2
and H3 be three hash functions where H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
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G1, H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n and H3 : {0, 1}∗ × G2 → Z∗q .
Heren is the key length of aDEMandq ≥ 2k ,where k is a
security parameter. Let P be a generator ofG1. The PKG
chooses a master secret key s ∈ Z∗q randomly and com-
putes Ppub = sP . The PKGpublishes system parameters
param = {G1,G2, q, n, eˆ, P, Ppub, H1, H2, H3} and
keeps the master secret key s secret.
– Extract Given an identity I D, the PKG computes the
corresponding private key SI D = sQI D and sends it to
its owner in a secure way. Here QI D = H1(I D).
– Sym Given a sender’s private key SI Ds and a receiver’s
identity I Dr , this algorithm works as follows.
1. Choose x from Z∗q randomly.
2. Compute z = eˆ(Ppub, QI Dr )x .
3. Output K = H2(z) and ω = (x, z, SI Ds , I Ds, I Dr ).
– Encap Given the state information ω and an arbitrary
tag τ , this algorithm works as follows.
1. Compute u = H3(τ, z).
2. Compute V = uSI Ds + x Ppub and T = eˆ(V, QI Dr ).
3. Compute R = uQI Ds .
4. Output ψ = (R, T ).
– Decap Given an encapsulation ψ = (R, T ), a tag τ , a
sender’s identity I Ds and a receiver’s private key SI Dr ,
this algorithm works as follows.
1. Compute z = T/eˆ(R, SI Dr ).
2. Compute u = H3(τ, z).
3. If R = uQI Ds , output the K = H2(z), otherwise
output the symbol ⊥.
5.3 Consistency
The consistency of our scheme can be easily verified by the
following equations.
z = T
eˆ(R, SI Dr )
= eˆ(V, QI Dr )
eˆ(R, SI Dr )
= eˆ(uSI Ds +x Ppub, QI Dr )
eˆ(R, SI Dr )
= eˆ(uSI Ds , QI Dr )eˆ(x Ppub, QI Dr )
eˆ(R, SI Dr )
= eˆ(uQI Ds , SI Dr )eˆ(Ppub, QI Dr )
x
eˆ(R, SI Dr )
= (Ppub, QI Dr )x .
5.4 Deniability
The receiver with private key SI Dr can generate an encap-
sulation that is indistinguishable from that generated by the
sender with private key SI Ds . To simulate the transcripts on
a tag τ , the receiver performs the steps below.
1. Choose x¯ from Z∗q randomly.
2. Compute z¯ = eˆ(Ppub, QI Dr )x¯ .
3. Compute u¯ = H3(τ, z¯).
4. Compute R¯ = u¯QI Ds .
5. Compute T¯ = z¯ · eˆ(R¯, SI Dr ).
ψ¯ = (R¯, T¯ ) generated by the receiver is indistinguishable
from ψ = (R, T ) that is generated by the sender according
to the Encap algorithm in Sect. 5.2. Letψ ′ = (R′, T ′) be an
encapsulation that is randomly chosen in the set of all valid
sender’s encapsulation intended to receiver. The probability
Pr[ψ¯ = ψ ′] is 1/(q − 1) because ψ¯ is generated from a
randomly chosen value x¯ ∈ Z∗q . Likewise, the probability
Pr[ψ = ψ ′] has the same value 1/(q − 1) because it is
generated from x ∈ Z∗q . That is, both distributions are the
same.
5.5 Security
Theorem 3 In the random oracle model, if an adversary
A has a non-negligible advantage datk against the IND-
CCA2 security of the proposed scheme when running in a
time t and performingqk key extraction queries, qs symmetric
key generation queries, qe key encapsulation queries, qd key
decapsulation queries and qHi queries to oracles Hi (i =
1, 2, 3), then there exists an algorithm C that can solve the
DBDH problem with an advantage
dbdh ≥  − qd/2
k−1
2qH1
in a time t ′ ≤ t + O(qs + qe + qd)tp, where tp denotes the
cost for one pairing operation.
Proof See Appendix 4. unionsq
Theorem 4 In the random oracle model, if an adversary
F is able to win the Game-IV with an advantage  ≥
5(qe + 1)(qe + qH3)qH1/(2k − 1) within a time t for a
security parameter k and asking at most qk key extrac-
tion queries, qs symmetric key generation queries, qe key
encapsulation queries, qd key decapsulation queries and qHi
queries to oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3), then there exists an algo-
rithm C′ that can solve the BDH problem in expected time
t ≤ 60343qH3qH12k t/(2k − 1).
Proof See Appendix 5. unionsq
6 Performance discussion
We compare major computational cost, communication
overhead, and formal security of straightforward “deniable
authentication followed by encryption” method with those
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Table 1 Performance
comparison
Schemes Computational cost Communication overhead Formal security
PM EC PC
SL+BF 6 3 7 3|G1| + |Z∗q | + |MAC | + 2|m| No
LXJ+BF 5 1 4 2|G1| + |G2| + 2|m| No
Ours 4 1 3 |G1| + |G2| + |m| Yes
of our scheme in Table 1. For convenience, we use SL+BF
to denote the straightforward method based on the deniable
authentication in [22] and the encryption scheme in [5] and
LXJ+BF to denote the straightforward method based on the
deniable authentication in [24] and the encryption scheme
in [5]. We denote by PM the point multiplication in G1, EC
the exponentiation computation in G2 and PC the pairing
computation. The other operations are ignored in Table 1
since these operations take themost running timeof thewhole
algorithm. |x | denotes the number of bits of x . From Table 1,
we find that our scheme has the least computational cost and
communication overhead. In addition, our scheme has the
formal security proof and the straightforward method has no
such property.
We give a quantitative analysis for the computational cost
and communication overhead. We use PBC Type A pair-
ing [25] in this analysis. The Type A pairing is constructed
on the curve
y2 ≡ (x3 + x) mod p
for some prime p ≡ 3 mod 4, where the embedding degree
is 2 and the order of G1 is q. In this analysis, we use three
kinds of parameters that represents 80-bit, 112-bit and 128-
bit AES [26] key size security level, respectively. Table 2
gives the specification for different security level of this
analysis.
Figure 2 gives the implementation time of SL+BF,
LXJ+BF and our scheme onThinkPadT430s that is equipped
with an Intel Core i5 3210M 2.5 GHz machine with 4G
RAM. From Fig. 2, we know that our scheme is 169.8−83.7169.8 =
50.7% faster and 108.3−83.7108.3 = 22.7% faster than SL+BF
and LXJ+BF, respectively, at 80-bit security level. At 112-
bit security level, our scheme is 835.5−407.2835.5 = 51.2%
faster and 528.2−407.2528.2 = 22.9% faster than SL+BF and
Table 2 Specification for different security level of this analysis (bits)



















Fig. 2 The implementation time
LXJ+BF, respectively. At 128-bit security level, our scheme
is 2003.9−970.32003.9 = 51.5% faster and 1260.6−970.31260.6 = 23.0%
faster than SL+BF and LXJ+BF, respectively.
Now we consider the communication overhead. Note that
for 80-bit, 112-bit and 128-bit security level, the correspond-
ing output sizes of MAC are 160 bits, 224 bits and 256 bits,
respectively. When we adopt the 80-bit security level, the
size of p is 512 bits. So the size of an element in group G1
is 1024 bits using an elliptic curve with 160 bits q. By stan-
dard compression technique [27], the size of an element in
group G1 can be reduced to 65 bytes. The size of an ele-
ment in G2 is 1024 bits. So, the communication overhead
of SL+BF, LXJ+BF and our scheme are 3|G1| + |Z∗q | +
|MAC | + 2|m| bits = 3 ∗ 65 + 20 + 20 + |m|/4 bytes =
235 + |m|/4 bytes, 2|G1| + |G2| + 2|m| bits = 2 ∗ 65 +
128+ |m|/4 bytes = 258+ |m|/4 bytes, and |G1| + |G2| +
|m| bits = 65 + 128 + |m|/8 bytes = 193 + |m|/8 bytes,
respectively. We can use the same method to compute the
communication overhead at the 112-bit security level and
128-bit security level. We summarize the communication
overhead at different security level in Fig. 3. Compared with
SL+BF and LXJ+BF, the communication overhead (here we
assume that |m| = 1000 bits) of our scheme is respec-
tively reduced by 485−318485 = 34.4% and 508−318508 = 37.4%
at the 80-bit security level. At the 112-bit security level,
the communication overhead of our scheme is respectively
reduced by 693−510693 = 26.4% and 764−510764 = 33.2%. At the
128-bit security level, the communication overhead of our
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Fig. 3 The communication overhead versus length of transmitted message. a 80-bit security level. b 112-bit security level. c 128-bit security level
Fig. 4 A secure e-mail protocol
123
634 F. Li et al.




In this section,we show an application of IBDEA to an e-mail
system.A secure e-mail system should provides confidential-
ity and authentication. Ifwe adopt “digital signature followed
by encryption” method, the privacy of the sender may be
infringed since the receiver can prove the source to any third
party. The DAE solves this problem in a good way. Here
we give a secure e-mail protocol using our IBDAE. This
protocol consists of a sender, a receiver and mail servers
and is described in Fig. 4. In this protocol, the identities of
the sender and receiver are e-mail addresses. For example,
the sender’s identity I Ds is alice@uestc.edu.cn and
the receiver’s identity I Dr is bob@uestc.edu.cn. The
sender first applies a private key SI Ds from the PKG and
then runsEncrypt(m, SI Ds , I Dr ) to get a ciphertextσ . The
sender transmits its identity I Ds , the receiver’s identity I Dr
and the ciphertext σ to its mail server. Then the sender’s mail
server transfers (I Ds, I Dr , σ ) to the receiver’s mail server.
The receiver’s mail server keeps (I Ds, I Dr , σ ) and waits
for the receiver. When the receiver hopes to receive its mail,
it submits its identity I Dr and password to its mail server
for authentication. If the receiver passes this authentication,
the mail server sends the (I Ds, I Dr , σ ) to the receiver. The
receiver can apply a private key SI Dr from the PKG and
then runs Decrypt(σ, I Ds, SI Dr ) to obtain the messagem.
Of course, the receiver can registers a private key SI Ds in
advance. The hybrid technique is very suitable for sending a
large e-mail.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid IBDAE scheme that can
achieve confidentiality and deniable authentication in a log-
ical single step. Our construction is based on an IBDATK
scheme and a DEM scheme. We proposed an IBDATK
scheme using bilinear pairings and proved its security in the
random oracle model. For typical security level, our scheme
is at least 50.7 and 22.7% faster than two straightforward
“deniable authentication followed by encryption” schemes,
respectively. The communication overhead is respectively
reduced at least 21.3 and 31.1%. A secure e-mail protocol
based on IBDAE was designed.
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Appendix
Data encapsulation mechanism (DEM)
A DEM is a symmetric encryption scheme that consists of
the following two algorithms.
– Enc is a deterministic encryption algorithm that takes
as input a security parameter k, a key K and a message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}∗, where
K ∈ KDEM is a key in the given key space, and m is
a bit string of arbitrary length. We denote this as c =
Enc(K ,m).
– Dec is a deterministic decryption algorithm that takes as
input a key K and a ciphertext c, and outputs the message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ or a symbol ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext
is invalid.
In this paper, we only require that a DEM is secure
with respect to indistinguishability against passive attack-
ers (IND-PA). Formally, this security notion is captured by
the following game played between an adversary A and a
challenger C.
– InitialA runs on input k and submits twoequal length
messages, m0 and m1.
– Challenge C selects a random key K ∈ KDEM and a
random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and sends c = Enc(K ,mβ) to A
as a challenge ciphertext.
– Guess A outputs a bit β ′ and wins the game if β ′ = β.
The advantage of A is defined to be Adv(A) = |2Pr[β ′ =
β] − 1|, where Pr[β ′ = β] is the probability that β ′ = β.
Definition 7 An adversary A is said to be an (dem, t)-
attacker of a DEM scheme if A has advantage at least dem
in the above game, runs in time at most t . A DEM scheme
is said to be (dem, t)-IND-PA secure if no (dem, t)-attacker
exists.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof Our proof method is as follows. We define a sequence
Game0, Game1, Game2 of modified attack games. The only
difference between games is how the environment responds
to A’s oracle queries.
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Let σ ∗ = (ψ∗, c∗) be the challenge ciphertext submitted
to A by its challenge oracle that encrypts either m0 or m1
according to a bit β. Let K ∗ denote the symmetric key used
by the challenge oracle in the generation of the challenge
ciphertext, or alternatively, the decapsulation of ψ∗ using
the identities I Ds and I Dr that are chosen by the adversary.
For any i = 0, 1, 2, we let Si be the event that δ′ = δ in game
Gamei , where δ is the bit chosen byA’s challenge oracle and
δ′ is the bit output by A. This probability is taken over the
random choices of A and those of A’s oracles.
We will use the following useful lemma from [28].
Lemma 1 ([28]) Let E, E ′, and F be events defined on a
probability space such that Pr[E ∧ ¬F] = Pr[E ′ ∧ ¬F].
Then we have
|Pr[E] − Pr[E ′]| ≤ Pr[F].
Game0: We simulate the view of the adversary in a real
attack by running the key extraction algorithm and using the
resulting keys to respond to A’s queries. So the view of A is






Game1: In this game, we slightly modify how the decryp-
tion oracle responds to queries from A. When a ciphertext
σ = (ψ, c), a sender’ identity I Di and a receiver’s identity
I D j are presented to the decryption oracle after the invo-
cation of the challenge encryption oracle, if I Di = I Ds ,
I D j = I Dr andψ = ψ∗, then the decryption oracle does not
use the genuine decryption procedure for the hybrid scheme,
instead it uses the key K ∗ to decrypt c and returns the result
to the adversary A.
Obviously this change has no impact on the adversary and
so
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0].
Game2: In this game, we modify Game1 by replacing K ∗
with a random key K ′ from KDEM. The result then follows
from the following Lemmas 2 and 3. unionsq
Lemma 2 There exists a probabilistic polynomial-timealgo-
rithm C1, whose running time is essentially the same as that
of A, such that
|Pr[S2] − Pr[S1]| = datk .
Proof In this proof, we show how to construct an adversary
C1 of the IBDATK to violate the assumed security against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
– InitialGiven the system parameters param, C1 sends
it to A.
– Phase 1WhenAmakes a key extraction query on iden-
tity I D, C1 makes a key extraction query to its own key
extraction oracle and forwards the answer to A. When A
makes an encryption query with a plaintextm, a sender’s
identity I Di and a receiver’s identity I D j , C1 follows the
steps below.
1. Make a symmetric key generation query on
(I Di , I D j ) to its own symmetric key generation ora-
cle to obtain K .
2. Compute c = DEM.Enc(K ,m).
3. Make a key encapsulation query on c to its own key
encapsulation oracle to obtain ψ .
4. Return the ciphertext σ = (ψ, c) to A.
WhenAmakes a decryption query with a ciphertext σ =
(ψ, c), a sender’s identity I Di and a receiver’s identity
I D j , C1 follows the steps below.
1. Make a key decapsulation query on (ψ, c, I Di , I D j )
to its own key decapsulation oracle to obtain K .
2. If K = ⊥, return ⊥ and stop.
3. Compute m = DEM.Dec(K , c) and return m.
– ChallengeA generates two equal length plaintextsm0
and m1, a sender’s identity I Ds and a receiver’s identity
I Dr on which it wishes to be challenged. C1 follows the
steps below.
1. Submit I Ds and I Dr to its challenger to obtain Kβ ,
where β ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Pick a random bit δ from {0, 1}.
3. Compute c∗ = DEM.Enc(Kβ,mδ).
4. Submit c∗ to its challenger to obtain ψ∗.
5. Return the ciphertext σ ∗ = (ψ∗, c∗) to A.
– Phase 2A can ask a polynomially bounded number of
queries adaptively again as in phase 1 with the restriction
that it cannot make a key extraction query on I Dr and
it cannot make a decryption query on σ ∗ = (ψ∗, c∗) to
obtain the corresponding plaintext.
– Guess A outputs δ′. If δ′ = δ, C1 outputs β ′ = 1 indi-
cating Kβ is the real key; otherwise it outputs β ′ = 0
indicating Kβ is a random key.
When Kβ is the real key, A is run exactly as it would be
run in Game1. This means that
Pr[S1] = Pr[δ′ = δ|β = 1] = Pr[β ′ = 1|β = 1].
When Kβ is the random key, A is run exactly as it would be
in Game2. This means that
Pr[S2] = Pr[δ′ = δ|β = 0] = Pr[β ′ = 1|β = 0].
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From the definition of security for IBDATK, we have
datk = |2Pr[β ′ = β] − 1| = |Pr[β ′ = 1|β = 1]
−Pr[β ′ = 1|β = 0]|.
So the result holds. unionsq
Lemma 3 There exists a probabilistic polynomial-timealgo-
rithm C2, whose running time is essentially the same as that






Proof To construct such a C2 we simply run A as it would
be run in game Game2. We run the key extraction step so
we can respond to A’s queries before it calls its challenge
encryption oracle. When A calls its challenge encryption
oracle with two messages m0 and m1, a sender’s identity
I Ds and a receiver’s identity I Dr , we simply relay m0 and
m1 to the challenge encryption oracle of C2 to obtain c∗.
We then make a symmetric key generation query and a key
encapsulation query to obtain K ∗ and ψ∗, respectively. We
discard K ∗ and return σ ∗ = (ψ∗, c∗) to A.
In this simulation A is run by C2 in exactly the same man-
ner as the former would be run in game Game2; moreover,
Pr[S2] corresponds exactly to the probability thatC2 correctly
determines the hidden bit of its challenge encryption oracle
since C2 outputs whatever A outputs. The result follows. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof Suppose that F is an adversary who can breaks the
DA-CMA security of the IBDAE scheme with advantage
dae.We can use this to construct another algorithmC that can
break the DA-CMA security of the IBDATK with advantage
at least datk too. C runs as follow.
– Initial Given the system parameters param, C sends
it to F .
– AttackWhen F makes a key extraction query on iden-
tity I D, C makes a key extraction query to its own key
extraction oracle and forwards the answer to F . When F
makes an encryption query with a plaintextm, a sender’s
identity I Di and a receiver’s identity I D j , C follows the
steps below.
1. Make a symmetric key generation query on
(I Di , I D j ) to its own symmetric key generation ora-
cle to obtain K .
2. Compute c = DEM.Enc(K ,m).
3. Make a key encapsulation query on c to its own key
encapsulation oracle to obtain ψ .
4. Return the ciphertext σ = (ψ, c) to F .
WhenF makes a decryption query with a ciphertext σ =
(ψ, c), a sender’s identity I Di and a receiver’s identity
I D j , C follows the steps below.
1. Make a key decapsulation query on (ψ, c, I Di , I D j )
to its own key decapsulation oracle to obtain K .
2. If K = ⊥, return ⊥ and stop.
3. Compute m = DEM.Dec(K , c) and return m.
– Forgery F outputs (σ ∗, I Ds, I Dr ), where σ ∗ =
(ψ∗, c∗). C outputs (ψ∗, τ ∗, I Ds, I Dr ), where τ ∗ = c∗.
Obviously, this simulation is perfect. If F wins the DA-
CMA game for the IBDAE, C have the same probability to
win the DA-CMA game for the IBDATK. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof C receives a random instance (P, aP, bP, cP, θ) of
the DBDH problem and attempts to decide whether θ =
eˆ(P, P)abc or not. C will run A as a subroutine and play
A’s challenger in Definition 3. A will consult C for answers
to the random oracles H1, H2 and H3. Roughly speaking,
these answers are randomly generated, but to maintain the
consistency and to avoid collision. C keeps three lists L1,
L2 and L3 respectively to store the answers. The following
assumptions are made.
1. A will ask for H1(I D) before I D is used in any key
extraction queries, symmetric keygeneration queries, key
encapsulation queries and key decapsulation queries.
2. An encapsulation returned from a key encapsulation
query will not be used byA in a key decapsulation query.
3. The sender’s identity and the receiver’s identity are differ-
ent inEncap andDecap algorithms. This assumption is
called irreflexivity assumption in [11]. Such an assump-
tion makes our proof simple.
– Initial C givesA the system parameters with Ppub =
cP . Note that c is unknown to C. This value simulates the
master secret key for the PKG.
– Phase 1 A performs a polynomially bounded number
of queries.
– H1 queriesC first selects a numberλ∈{1, 2, . . . , qH1}
randomly.A asks a polynomially bounded number of
H1 queries on identities of its choice. At the λ-th H1
query, C answers by H1(I Dλ) = bP . For queries
H1(I Di ) with i 
= λ, C selects di ∈ Z∗q randomly,
inserts the pair (I Di , di ) in the list L1 and answers
H1(I Di ) = di P .
– H2 and H3 queries When A asks queries on these
hash values, C checks the corresponding list. If an
entry for the query is found, the same answer will be
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given to A; otherwise, a randomly chosen value will
be used as the answer to A. The query and answer
will then be inserted in the list.
– Key extraction queries A submits an identity I Di
to C. If I Di = I Dλ, then C fails and stops. If
I Di 
= I Dλ, then the list L1 must contain a pair
(I Di , di ) for some di (this indicates C previously
answered H1(I Di ) = di P). The private key for I Di
is di Ppub = di cP . It is computed by C and returned
to A.
– Symmetric key generation queries A produces a
sender’s identity I Di and a receiver’s identity I D j .
If I Di 
= I Dλ. C first obtains the private key SI Di
by running a key extraction query. Then C answers
the query by running (K , ω) = Sym(SI Di , I D j )
algorithm. Note that C needs to store ω and to over-
write any previous value. If I Di = I Dλ and hence
I D j 
= I Dλ by the irreflexivity assumption, C first
chooses x from Z∗q randomly and computes z =
eˆ(Ppub, QI Dj )
x . Then C runs the H2 simulation algo-
rithm to find K = H2(z). Finally, C gives K to A.
Note that the ω is (x, z, I Di , I D j ) in this case.
– Key encapsulation queries A produces an arbitrary
tag τ . C checks whether there exists a stored value
ω. If not, it returns ⊥ and stops. Otherwise we have
the following two cases to consider. The first case
is I Di 
= I Dλ. In this case, C just runs ψ =
Encap(ω, τ) and returns the result to A. The sec-
ond case is I Di = I Dλ and hence I D j 
= I Dλ by
the irreflexivity assumption. In this case, C first runs
the H3 simulation algorithm to get u = H3(τ, z) and
then computes R = uQI Di and T = z · eˆ(R, SI D j )(C
could obtain SI D j from the key extraction algorithm
because I D j 
= I Dλ). Finally, C gives ψ = (R, T )
to A.
– Key decapsulation queriesA selects an encapsulation
ψ , a tag τ , a sender’s identity I Di and a receiver’s
identity I D j . If I D j = I Dλ, C always answers
A that (ψ, τ) is invalid. If A previously asked the
hash value H3(τ, z), where z = T/eˆ(R, SI D j ), and
C answered u that satisfies R = uQI Di , C will fail. In
this instance, (ψ, τ) is actually valid from A’s point
of view. The probability of this instance is at most
1/2k . If I D j 
= I Dλ, C first obtains SI D j from the
key extraction algorithm and then sends the result of
Decap(ψ, τ, I Di , SI D j ) to A.
– ChallengeA decides when phase 1 ends. A produces
a sender’s identity I Ds and a receiver’s identity I Dr on
which it hopes to be challenged. If A has asked a key
extraction query on I Dλ, C fails. On the other hand, if A
does not choose I Dr = I Dλ as target identity, C fails too.
C first chooses T ∗ ∈ G2, sets R∗ = aP and computes
z∗ = T ∗/θ (where θ is C’s candidate for the DBDH
problem). Then C runs the H2 simulation algorithm to
find K1 = H2(z∗). C chooses K0 ∈ KIBDATK and a
bit β ∈ {0, 1} randomly, and sends Kβ to A. A then
sends a tag τ ∗ to C. Finally, C gives the encapsulation
ψ∗ = (R∗, T ∗) to A.
– Phase 2A can ask a polynomially bounded number of
queries adaptively again as in phase 1 with the restriction
that it cannot make a key extraction query on I Dr and
cannot make a decapsulation query on (ψ∗, τ ∗) to obtain
the corresponding key.
– GuessAoutputs a bitβ ′ forwhich it believes the relation
(Kβ, ω∗) = Sym(SI Ds , I Dr ) andψ∗ = Encap(ω∗, τ ∗)
hold. At this moment, if β ′ = β, C returns 1 that denotes
θ = eˆ(P, P)abc; otherwise, it returns 0 that denotes θ 
=
eˆ(P, P)abc.
We now assess C’s probability of success. Note that C only
fails in providing a consistent simulation because one of the
following independent events:
E1 A does not choose I Dλ as the receiver’s identity in
the challenge phase.
E2 A has made a key extraction query on I Dλ.
E3 C aborts in a key decapsulation query because of
rejecting an valid encapsulation.
We know that Pr[¬E1] = 1/qH1 and Pr[E3] ≤ qd/2k . In
addition, we know that ¬E1 implies ¬E2.
Since
p1 = Pr[β ′ = β|(Kβ, ω∗) = Sym(SI Ds , I Dr ) and ψ∗
= Encap(ω∗, τ ∗)]





p0 = Pr[β ′ = i |θ ∈R G2] = 1
2
for i = 0, 1,
We have














=  − qd/2
k−1
2qH1
The bound on C’s computation time comes from the fact that
C needs O(qs +qe +qd) pairing operations in the symmetric
key generation queries, key encapsulation queries and key
decapsulation queries. unionsq
123
638 F. Li et al.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof Here we use the forking lemma [29] to prove the secu-
rity of our scheme. To use the forking lemma, we need to
showhowour schemefits into the signature schemedescribed
in [29], the simulation step in which the signature can be sim-
ulatedwithout the sender’s private key (and thus, alsowithout
the master secret key), and how we can solve BDH problem
based on the forgery.
First, we observe that our scheme satisfies the require-
ment described in [29]. During the encapsulation of a tag
τ , the tuple (σ1, u, σ2) is generated that corresponds to the
required three-phase honest-verifier zero-knowledge identi-
fication protocol, where σ1 = z is the commitment of the
prover, u = H3(τ, z) is the hash value depending on τ and
σ1 substituted for the verifier’s challenge, and σ2 = T is the
response of the prover that relies on σ1, u and the sender’s
private key SI Ds .
Next, we need to show a simulation step that supplies a
faithful simulation to the forgerF and how to solve the BDH
problem by interacting withF . C receives a random instance
(P, aP, bP, cP)of theBDHproblemand is required to com-
pute h = eˆ(P, P)abc. C will run F as a subroutine and plays
F’s challenger in the game of Definition 4. We describe this
process as follows.
– Initial C runs Setup algorithmwith a security para-
meter k and sends the systemparameterswith Ppub = cP
to F .
– Attack C answers F’s queries according to the method
in Theorem 3 except that the simulator should choose
two different random numbers χ, ξ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qH1} in
advance. At theχ -th H1 query, C answers by H1(I Dχ ) =
aP . At the ξ -th H1 query, C answers by H1(I Dξ ) = bP .
If we let I Dλ = {I Dχ , I Dξ }, the simulation process is
the same as that in Theorem 3.
– Forgery F outputs a quaternion (ψ∗, τ ∗, I Dχ , I Dξ ),
whereψ∗ = (R∗, T ∗). We coalesce the identities I Dλ =
{I Dχ , I Dξ } and the tag τ ∗ into a “generalized” forged
tag (I Dλ, τ ∗) so as to hide the identity-based aspect of the
DA-CMA attack, and simulate the setting of an identity-
less adaptive-CMAexistential forgery forwhich the fork-
ing lemma is proven. From the the forking lemma [29],
if F is a sufficiently efficient forger in the above inter-
action, then we can construct a Las Vegas machine F ′
that outputs two signed tags ((I Dλ, τ ∗), u∗, ψ∗) and
((I Dλ, τ ∗), u¯∗, ψ¯∗) with u∗ 
= u¯∗ and the same com-
mitment z∗. To solve the BDH problem based on the
machine F ′ derived from F , we construct a machine C′
as follows.
1. C′ runs F ′ to get two distinct signatures ((I Dλ, τ ∗),
u∗, ψ∗) and ((I Dλ, τ ∗), u¯∗, ψ¯∗).
2. C′ computes eˆ(P, P)abc as (T ∗/T¯ ∗)1/(u∗−u¯∗).
From the forking lemma [29] and the lemma on the rela-
tionship between given-identity attack and chosen-identity
attack [8], if F succeeds in time t with probability  ≥
5(qe +1)(qe +qH3)qH1/(2k −1), then C′ can solve the BDH
problem in expected time t ≤ 60343qH3qH12k t/(2k − 1).
Note that the coefficient is changed because the simulator
should choose two different identities in advance. unionsq
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